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SECOND DEPARTMENT
Briggs v. Stang1252
(decided December 29, 1995)
Petitioner, a subway car conductor for the New York City
Transit Authority, brought an article 78 proceeding against
respondents, the Transit Authority, to "vacate and annul a notice
of termination" of his employment and to reinstate him to his
position as a subway car conductor. 253 Petitioner claimed that his
state2 5 4 and federal 2 5 5 constitutional protection against illegal

searches and seizures had been violated by the respondent's
requirement that he submit to a "return-to-work drug test
pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement" between the
Transit Authority and his union. 25 6 The Appellate Division,
Second Department, disagreed with the petitioner, stating that
"[t]he constitutional rights of individual public employees
represented by collective bargaining agents may be waived by the
consent of those agents." 25 7 In addition, the court stated that the
drug testing was reasonable, even in the absence of reasonable
suspicion, in light of the fact that the petitioner's job was "safety
sensitive." 258 Accordingly, the court affirmed the lower court's
decision and dismissed the petitioner's claim.259
252. 635 N.Y.S.2d 687 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1995).
253. Id. at 687-88.
254. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12. This section provides in relevant part: "The

right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... " Id.
255. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides in relevant
part: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated...

."

Id.

256. Briggs, 635 N.Y.S.2d at 688.
257. Id. (citing Antinore v. State, 49 A.D.2d 6, 371 N.Y.S.2d 213 (2d
Dep't 1975), aft'd, 40 N.Y.2d 921, 358 N.E.2d 268, 389 N.Y.S.2d 576
(1976)).
258. Id.
259. Id.
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The court relied on Antinore v. State of New York2 60 for the
proposition that any decisions made by a union agent while acting
on behalf of employees to a collective bargaining agreement are
binding on the group of employees that the agent represents. 26 1
The court in Antinore stated that "the fact that [an employee] did
not himself approve the agreement negotiated by his
representative and now disclaims satisfaction with one aspect of
the agreement makes it no less binding upon him." 262
Thus, in the case at bar, the court held that it was constitutional
for the respondent to require a return-to-work drug test because it
was an agreed upon method of drug testing between the
petitioner's union agent and the defendant. 263 In addition, the
court stated that the fact that the petitioner's job is "safety
sensitive" is grounds enough to test him for drug use regardless
of what agreement, if any, had been made between his union
agents and the respondents. 2 64
The court relied on the case of Caruso v. Ward265 for this
proposition. In Caruso, the court discussed the possibility of
performing drug testing on an individual without having
reasonable suspicion and still remaining within the constitutional
boundaries of the Fourth Amendment. 266 The New York Court
of Appeals in Caruso stated that "random searches conducted by
the State without reasonable suspicion are closely scrutinized, and
generally only permitted when the privacy interests implicated
are minimal, the government's interest is substantial, and
safeguards are provided to insure that the individual's reasonable
expectation of privacy is not subjected to unregulated
discretion."267 Accordingly, the Briggs court decided that

260. 49 A.D.2d 6, 371 N.Y.S.2d 213 (2d Dep't 1975), aff'd, 40 N.Y.2d
921, 358 N.E.2d 268, 389 N.Y.S.2d 576 (1976).
261. Id. at 10-11, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 216-17.
262. Id. at 11, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 217.
263. Briggs, 635 N.Y.S.2d at 688.
264. Id.
265. 72 N.Y.2d 432, 530 N.E.2d 850, 534 N.Y.S.2d 142 (1987).
266. Id. at 437-39, 530 N.E.2d at 852-53, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 144-45.

267. Id. at 438, 530 N.E.2d at 853, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 154.
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because the petitioner's job was "safety sensitive," the reasonable
suspicion requirement could be circumvented. 2 68
In conclusion, the Briggs court held that regardless of what the
petitioner's personal beliefs were with regard to the return-towork drug policy, the petitioner was required to adopt the
position the agent had negotiated for his union. 269 Pursuant to the
collective bargaining agreement between the two entities, it was
agreed that the drug testing policy was permissible. 270 As a
result, 27 1 the petitioner's right to be free from an unreasonable
search pursuant to the Fourth Amendment was held not to be
infringed. Thus, citing to the Federal Constitution, Briggs stands
for the proposition that the New York State Constitution goes no
further than federal constitutional doctrine in protecting
employee's in "safety sensitive" jobs from drug testing.
People v. Owens 272
(decided February 3, 1995)
The defendant, charged with criminal possession of a
weapon, 273 moved to have evidence, specifically a gun and
several statements made to the arresting police officers,
suppressed. 274 The defendant argued that the evidence taken by
the police officers was gained during a "pre-text stop" of
defendant's vehicle, and as such, should not serve as a basis for
seizure of the gun or defendant's subsequent statements to the
police officers. 275 The court suppressed the evidence, holding
268. Briggs, 635 N.Y.S.2d at 688.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. 164 Misc. 2d 15, 623 N.Y.S.2d 719 (Sup. Ct. New York County
1995).
273. See N.Y. CIUM. PROC. LAw § 265.02 (McKinney 1989). This section
provides in pertinent part: "A person is guilty of criminal possession of a
weapon in the third degree when: ... (4) he possesses any loaded firearm."
Id.
274. Owens, 164 Misc. 2d at 15-16, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 720.
275. Id. at 18, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 721.
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